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Privacy and incrementalism 
 
Thomas DC Bennett 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
English and Welsh tort law has no answer to ‘pure’ intrusions into individuals’ privacy. This 
is because there is no broad tort of ‘invasion of privacy’, nor a discrete tort of ‘intrusion upon 
seclusion’. English and Welsh law does contain two doctrines that respond to information-
based privacy violations: equitable confidentiality and the ‘tort’ of ‘misuse of private 
information’.1 But neither responds to intrusions in the absence of some information-based 
wrongdoing. The gap in protection against intrusions sets English and Welsh law apart from 
other common law jurisdictions including the USA, Canada and New Zealand. Scholars have 
long lamented this lacuna, but little has been done to try to uncover the reasons why it persists.2 
We do not need yet another normative argument in favour of recognising an intrusion tort. 
What is now needed is a concerted effort to understand the reasons for the persistence of the 
intrusion lacuna, so that an effective challenge to it can be made. This chapter seeks to drive 
the debate in this field forward by identifying one such reason.3 
The reason that is identified in this chapter concerns the methodology adopted by 
English and Welsh courts in developing our information-focused privacy law. The 
methodology is highly restrictive, and we can get to grips with it by theorising the manner in 
which courts elaborate the common law – a practice known as ‘incrementalism’. The prevailing 
methodology in English and Welsh privacy cases exhibits the characteristics of incrementalism 
in its ‘narrow’ form. But it is necessary, if we are to understand narrow incrementalism’s 
predominance in privacy, to go further. We must uncover the rationale that underpins its 
predominance. The rationale is, as we shall see, tightly connected to a formalistic conception 
of the judicial role, itself emanating from a formalistic conception of the rule of law. Narrow 
incrementalism is merely a manifestation of this formalistic conception. But it has a profound 
effect: it creates an apparent ‘formal barrier’ to the recognition of an intrusion tort (or indeed 
to the recognition of a broader, all-encompassing privacy tort). This formal barrier keeps the 
intrusion lacuna firmly in place. 
Overcoming the formal barrier is a necessary (though not in itself sufficient) condition 
for solving the intrusion lacuna within English tort law. For it has become firmly engrained in 
the judiciary’s understanding of what can and cannot be done in the field of privacy. But it is 
only once we identify this formal barrier as bearing significant (though not exclusive) 
responsibility for the persistence of the intrusion lacuna that we can then begin to sketch out a 
way to overcome it. We can locate a solution by looking to comparable jurisdictions that have 
recognised intrusion torts notwithstanding the presence of similar, rule of law-based arguments 
                                                          
1 It is unclear whether ‘misuse of private information’ can properly be regarded as tortious. The English and Welsh 
courts have concluded that it is, but their reasoning is unpersuasive. See infra note 14, and accompanying text. 
2 See Nicole A Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law 
Quarterly Review 628. See also David Eady, ‘A Statutory Right to Privacy’ (1996) 3 European Human Rights 
Law Review 243; Basil Markesinis et al, ‘Concerns and Ideas about the Developing English Law of Privacy (and 
How Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help)’ (2004) 52 American Journal of Comparative Law 133; 
Raymond Wacks, Privacy and Media Freedom (OUP 2013). 
3 There is at least one other reason for the persistence of the intrusion lacuna in English and Welsh law, which I 
do not explore here (for lack of space). That other reason concerns the difficulties in conceptualising ‘privacy’ in 
a manner that makes it amenable to legal protection. I address that matter separately elsewhere. See Thomas DC 
Bennett, ‘Triangulating Intrusion in Privacy Law’ (2019) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
against doing so, and in particular by identifying the methodology courts developing those torts 
adopt. This essay uses Canada as its main comparator. The province of Ontario recognised an 
intrusion tort in 2012 in the case of Jones v Tsige.4 When we unpack that decision, we can see 
that it embraced a different, wider mode of incrementalism. This wider mode, being less 
constrained by precedent and more concerned with achieving alignment with underlying legal 
and policy principles, legitimised the recognition of a novel head of liability. The same thing 
(methodologically speaking) occurred in New Zealand mere months after the Jones decision.5 
And it happened again in Ontario in 2016, when a second novel privacy tort – public disclosure 
of private facts – was recognised there.6 
Before we engage in our comparative exercise, however, we must begin by examining 
the intrusion lacuna as it persists in English and Welsh law. 
 
2 The intrusion lacuna 
 
When I talk of privacy ‘intrusions’ in this chapter, I mean acts that intrude (whether physically 
or, in this technologically advanced age, virtually) into a person’s private space, property or 
affairs.7 Some intrusions lead to an intruder obtaining private information which is then 
disseminated. Such instances appear to straddle the distinction between intrusion-type and 
informational privacy violations; since both occur, courts might legitimately resolve the entire 
case through a legal mechanism that focuses on one type of privacy violation rather than the 
other.8 Whilst these sorts of cases might give rise to conceptual difficulties, they are not 
examples of the problem with which I am concerned. For in this chapter I am addressing the 
lacuna that exists in respect of ‘pure’ intrusions. A ‘pure’ intrusion is one in which an intrusive 
act takes place but either (a) no private information is obtained by the intruder, or (b) if 
information is obtained, no dissemination of it takes place. I make mention of some examples 
a little later in this section. 
Protection for privacy interests in English and Welsh law has long focused on the 
protection of information from unauthorised dissemination, rather than on protecting people 
from intrusive acts. A cause of action has lain in equity providing relief for ‘breach of 
confidence’ for nearly two hundred years.9 Whilst the jurisdiction of the courts of equity was 
primarily used in early cases to guard against commercial breaches of confidence (often in an 
employment setting), it is clear that creative counsel were able to mobilise this doctrine as early 
as the nineteenth century to protect privacy interests.10 By some wholly obscure process that 
                                                          
4 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32, 108 OR (3d) 241. 
5 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
6 Jane Doe 464553 v ND 2016 ONSC 541, 128 OR (3d) 252. 
7 In so doing, I draw a clear distinction between information-based privacy violations and intrusion-type privacy 
violations. This distinction has its roots in William Prosser’s taxonomy (infra note 90,). Whilst popular amongst 
privacy scholars, it should be noted that this distinction does not enjoy universal support. Paul Wragg, for 
instance, has recently challenged the distinction in ‘Recognising a Privacy-Invasion Tort: The Conceptual Unity 
of Informational and Intrusion Claims’ (2019) 78 Cambridge Law Journal 409. 
8 The phone hacking case of Gulati v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2015] WLR(D) 
232 is a good example of this. The hacking of the claimants’ voicemails constituted intrusive acts, whilst the 
publication in national newspapers of private information gleaned from the hacked accounts constituted 
informational violations. The English and Welsh courts dealt with the case as a ‘misuse of private information’ 
(that is, using information-based privacy doctrine). But this was possible only because of the presence of private 
information that had been (a) obtained, and (b) published, without consent (or other lawful excuse). See further 
infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
9 The history of the doctrine of confidentiality is masterfully explored in Megan Richardson et alia, Breach of 
Confidence: Social Origins and Modern Developments (Edward Elgar 2012).  
10 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 H & Tw 1, 47 ER 1302. The court even went so far as to state expressly that 
‘privacy is the right invaded’ (1312). 
has been variously described as one of ‘development’,11 ‘adaptation’12 and ‘absorption’,13 but 
which has yet to be adequately explained,14 the equitable doctrine of confidence ‘morphed’15 
into (but mysteriously somehow also continued to exist separately from) a cause of action for 
‘misuse of private information’ (MPI) in the 2004 case of Campbell v Mirror Group 
Newspapers.16  
This development was spurred by the statutory requirement, which arose when the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) came into force in 2000, for the English common law to 
achieve compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights.17 It will be helpful at 
this point to pause and explain briefly the relationship between the HRA and the incremental 
method that is the focus of this chapter. The HRA has an impact on the common law, in that it 
obliges the courts both to elaborate the common law sufficiently to make it Convention-
compatible, and to act compatibly with Convention rights when they do so. But it does not 
prescribe a particular developmental methodology for the courts to use when doing this. As 
such, the manner in which the HRA affects the common law, by a method known as ‘indirect 
horizontal effect’,18 does not fundamentally alter the incremental method by which the common 
law develops.19 Indeed, the very essence of indirect horizontality is that the common law 
remains the vehicle through which Convention-compatibility is achieved. This stands in 
opposition to a notion of direct horizontality (not adopted by domestic courts in the UK), 
according to which the common law would be supplanted by direct statutory recourse to the 
courts under the HRA in cases involving human rights violations committed by private (that 
is, non-state) actors.20 This preference for indirect (rather than direct) horizontal effect retains 
‘incrementalism’ as the touchstone of legitimate common law development. So, whilst we 
should acknowledge the fact that the HRA spurred the courts into action in elaborating the 
doctrine of misuse of private information, we should not assume that this entailed the adoption 
of a radically different developmental methodology; it did not. 
With English and Welsh law having focused on protecting against informational 
violations of privacy since the nineteenth century, a glaring gap in protection for privacy 
interests jeopardised by physical intrusions into personal space went unaddressed. It became 
clear in the late twentieth century that the equitable doctrine of confidence would not assist the 
victims of intrusion-style privacy violations. In 1990, the case of Kaye v Robertson came before 
the Court of Appeal.21 The problem faced by Kaye’s lawyers was the lack of a cause of action 
                                                          
11 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, [255]. See also Vidal-Hall v Google, Inc. [2015] EWCA 
Civ 311, [2016] QB 1003, [38]. 
12 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 8) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2005] 3 WLR 881, [51]. See also Vidal-Hall, ibid. 
13 A v B Plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195, [4]. See also Vidal-Hall (CA), ibid, [21]. 
14 On the inability of the courts to explain clearly or coherently the emergence of the MPI doctrine from equitable 
confidence, see Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Judicial Activism and the Nature of “Misuse of Private Information”’ 
(2018) 23(2) Communications Law 74. 
15 Wacks, supra note 2, 69 and 103ff. 
16 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. 
17 See further infra note 115, and accompanying text. 
18 The language of horizontal effect has its roots in the European Court of Justice ruling in Van Gend en Loos v 
Neder-Landse Tariefcommissie (Case 26/62), [1963] ECR 1. There has since been something of a (linguistic) 
‘spill-over’ effect into municipal law, making use of ‘horizontal effect’ and ‘vertical effect’ as terms of art to 
describe the relationship between higher-order public law and both private individuals and the state respectively.  
19 On the centrality of incrementalism to common law developmental method under the HRA, see Gavin 
Phillipson and Alexander Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) Modern 
Law Review 878. 
20 On direct horizontal effect, see William Wade, ‘Horizons of Horizontality’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 
217. 
21 [1991] FSR 62. An actor, Gordon Kaye, had been seriously injured in a traffic accident. As he recovered in 
intensive care in hospital, two journalists from the Sunday Sport managed to gain access to his private room (in 
breach of clear instructions not to enter) and conducted what they described as an ‘interview’ with the barely 
in which they could base a claim. Kaye’s lawyers ruled out pleading the case in breach of 
confidence (perhaps too hastily). As such, the Court had no opportunity to consider whether 
that doctrine could provide relief. Nevertheless, there is no indication in the judgment that the 
judges thought breach of confidence would have availed the plaintiff. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeal lamented the lack of a privacy tort apt to assist Gordon Kaye in the circumstances.22 In 
the end, the Court mobilised the lesser-known doctrine of malicious falsehood to grant some 
relief (on rather tenuous grounds, since it was far from clear that Kaye had suffered the special 
damage required by the doctrine). But a glaring gap in privacy protection had been exposed.23 
In the late 1990s, the case of Wainwright v Home Office highlighted the intrusion lacuna 
even more vividly.24 Wainwright did not involve the publication of any private information 
whatsoever; it was, in essence, a case of pure intrusion. A mother and son were strip-searched 
on a visit to a Leeds prison in a manner that breached prison rules.25 Both claimants suffered 
emotional distress; the son, who had physical and learning disabilities, also developed Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. They brought a claim for, inter alia, invasion of privacy. After 
hearings in the County Court and Court of Appeal, the case was heard in – and the claim 
rejected by – the House of Lords. A key ground for the rejection of the claim was the lack of 
any privacy-based cause of action in English and Welsh law apt to respond to intrusion-type 
privacy violations such as these.26 
Some scholars have suggested, based on recent cases, that English and Welsh law is 
becoming more willing to recognise and remedy privacy violations that resemble pure 
intrusions.27 However, even brief scrutiny reveals such suggestions to be premature. In Gulati 
v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd, claimants whose voicemail accounts had been compromised 
by the defendant recovered damages, despite much of the information thereby gleaned never 
being published.28 However, the decision, rendered in MPI, does not recognise a novel head of 
liability. Although the level of damages awarded was confirmed on appeal, the issue of liability 
was uncontested even at first instance; the defendant admitted – perhaps unnecessarily – that 
its conduct amounted to a misuse of private information.29 Moreover, even if there had been 
some expansion of the doctrine’s limits, Gulati would still be firmly focused on the obtaining 
of information; there is nothing in the case to suggest that an intrusion through which no 
information was obtained has become actionable.30 
                                                          
conscious Kaye. They also took photographs of him in that state to accompany their planned scoop. Lawyers for 
Kaye sought injunctive relief to restrain publication of the ‘interview’ and the pictures. 
22 Id. 70. 
23 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson argued that Kaye might have succeeded in a claim for breach of 
confidence, had his lawyers pleaded it (‘Confidence and Privacy: a Re-Examination’ (1996) 55(3) Cambridge 
Law Journal 447, 454). 
24 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406. 
25 Both claimants were required to undress fully (the rules stating that a person being searched should not be 
required to expose both their top and bottom halves simultaneously). The mother was searched in a room that did 
not have adequate window coverings and was searched, improperly, by male officers. The son also suffered a 
battery when officers manipulated his penis in order to retract his foreskin. 
26 Wainwright supra note 24, [18]. 
27 The term ‘misuse of private information’ first appears in Campbell supra note 16, [14] (Lord Nicholls). 
28 Gulati, supra note 8. Suggestions that Gulati exemplifies a novel, intrusion facet of the MPI doctrine can be 
found in Nicole A Moreham, ‘Liability for Listening: Why Phone Hacking is an Actionable Breach of Privacy’ 
(2015) 7(2) Journal of Media Law 155, and John Hartshorne, ‘The Need for an Intrusion upon Seclusion Privacy 
Tort within English Law’ (2017) 46(4) Common Law World Review 287. cf Jacob Rowbottom, ‘A Landmark at a 
Turning Point: Campbell and the Use of Privacy Law to Constrain Media Power’ (2015) 7(2) Journal of Media 
Law 170. 
29 See further Rowbottom, id. 
30 The second case giving rise to suggestions that intrusion is now covered by English law is PJS v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] 1 AC 1081. However, as in Gulati, there is no suggestion in the case 
that an MPI claim could succeed in a ‘pure’ intrusion situation where there was neither non-consensual acquisition 
Making a case for the recognition of an intrusion tort, Nicole Moreham finds that MPI 
doctrine provides inadequate protection for an individual’s right to protection from undesired 
access to his person.31 By this, she primarily has in mind acts of ‘unwanted watching, listening 
and recording’.32 The common law is inadequate because ‘[n]either breach of confidence nor 
misuse of private information . . . protects against the non-disclosure aspects of physical 
privacy.’33 There is thus ‘no clear common law right protecting against unwanted observation 
and recording where subsequent dissemination of material has not occurred.’34 Moreham has 
also conducted an extensive survey of alternative legal remedies for intrusion-type privacy 
violations and has concluded that none of these provides a satisfactory substitute for an 
intrusion tort.35 
Patrick O’Callaghan concurs with this bleak assessment, noting the ‘significant’ gap in 
English and Welsh law in respect of intrusions.36 He sees ‘absolutely nothing in recent case 
law to suggest that the new tort [of MPI] could potentially encompass other forms of invasion 
of privacy’.37 This leads him to the ‘unhappy conclusion’ that, if Kaye were to be litigated once 
again in the light of the MPI tort, the courts would reach the same conclusion as before on the 
non-availability of protection against physical privacy intrusions.38 This must surely, as a 
matter of formal law, be correct. A remedy would only be available in a Kaye-type scenario if 
the information obtained (the photographs and the ‘interview’) was published.39 If the 
journalists who entered his room obtained information that they subsequently decided was not 
sufficiently newsworthy to publish, there would be no remedy available in tort (or equity) for 
the pure intrusion.  
English and Welsh law’s intrusion lacuna thus persists, despite attracting derision from 
pro-privacy commentators. Raymond Wacks tells us that, currently, the Wainwright ruling 
means that ‘[a] claimant who is subjected to an intrusion must . . . look elsewhere for a 
remedy.’40 By this he means that such a claimant must look outside of tort law as it presently 
stands. He has proposed a statutory intrusion tort as a solution, but there has been no sign of 
any desire to enact such legislation in the UK Parliament in recent years.41 
 
3 English and Welsh law’s narrowly-focused privacy jurisprudence 
 
The line of authority that began with the recognition of breach of confidence as an equitable 
wrong and which has, in recent times, led to the intrusion lacuna in English and Welsh law 
discloses the predominance of a particular, restrictive kind of judicial thinking. It manifests, in 
large part, as a commitment to placing tight constraints on judicial law-making. This is 
                                                          
nor dissemination of private information. As such, PJS cannot be said to have opened up the MPI doctrine into 
anything even close to a full-blown intrusion tort. 
31 Moreham, supra note 2. 
32 Nicole A Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law’ (2014) 73(2) Cambridge Law 
Journal 350, 362. 
33 Id. 362. 
34 Id. 364. 
35 Id. 
36 Patrick O’Callaghan, Refining Privacy in Tort Law (Springer 2013) 133, 146. 
37 Id. 155. 
38 Id. 
39 Moreham has argued that the phone-hacking case of Gulati demonstrates an increasing willingness on the part 
of the judiciary to provide relief for violations of ‘physical privacy’ in Moreham, supra note 28, 164. For reasons 
that I and others have given elsewhere, it remains premature to suggest that Gulati reflects an emergent intrusion 
tort. See Bennett, supra note 3 and Rowbottom, supra note 28, 186. 
40 Wacks, supra note 2, 187. 
41 Id. 263–70. 
attributed, in key cases, to a particular conception of the judicial role that displays classically 
formalist characteristics. 
The most obvious way in which this restrictive conception appears in the cases is as a 
perceived prohibition on ‘radical’ extensions of the law, whatever that might mean. Four cases 
will suffice to exemplify this point. In Malone, Megarry V-C concludes that ‘it is no function 
of the courts to legislate in a new field. The extension of the existing laws and principles is one 
thing, the creation of an altogether new right is another’.42 Ultimately this concern leads him 
to reject the opportunity to recognise a novel privacy tort. The formalistic conception of the 
judicial role also bulks large in Kaye, with Bingham LJ stating openly that the court ‘cannot’ 
give the plaintiff a privacy-based remedy.43 The Court, moreover, speaks expressly of the 
desirability of Parliament legislating in this field, suggesting that the judges thought that 
extending the law to cover the situation at hand would be too radical a step. In Wainwright, 
Lord Hoffmann contrasts the legitimacy of extending ‘an existing principle’ with attempting 
‘radical change’.44 His Lordship did not give a clear indication of exactly where he would draw 
the line, but gives Khorasandjian v Bush45 (in which the claimant sought the extension of the 
tort of private nuisance to encompass telephone harassment) as an example of an attempt at a 
‘radical change’ that went ‘a step too far’.46 In Campbell, Baroness Hale echoes Lord 
Hoffmann’s Wainwright judgment when she states that ‘the courts will not invent a new cause 
of action to cover types of activity which were not previously covered’ and that ‘our law cannot, 
even if it wanted to, develop a general tort of invasion of privacy’.47  
One particularly prominent proponent of such a formalistic conception of the judicial 
role, emanating from his formalistic conception of the rule of law, is Joseph Raz.48 The key 
theme of Raz’s account of the judicial obligation is that the central function of law is the 
provision of authoritative guidance by which the law’s addressees may regulate their conduct. 
This central tenet of Raz’s formalism features heavily in his conception of the rule of law, 
which requires that legal rules be prospective, clear and (relatively) stable, with clear secondary 
rules for determining which pronouncements from the authority are to be regarded as laws 
(rules of recognition). 
In advancing his concept of practical reason, Raz identifies first- and second-order 
reasons for decision-making. It is necessary to unpack these at this stage, for they have 
relevance to the elucidation of different forms of ‘incrementalism’ in the next section. First-
order reasons may comprise any reasons to make a decision one way or another. These might 
involve matters of policy, convenience, efficiency, financial concerns, moral inclinations and 
so forth (the list is not exhaustive). A decision made on a balance of these first-order reasons 
amounts to the exercise of discretion; the decision-maker has discretion to weigh these reasons 
(of presumptively equal weight) against one another and conclude as he sees fit.  
Exclusionary reasons are second-order reasons not to act on the conclusion reached by 
balancing first-order reasons. They are secondary rules that override the first-order balancing 
exercise. Raz gives an example of such an exclusionary reason being a rule against making 
major investment decisions when tired or intoxicated.49 Exclusionary reasons always override 
first-order reasons for action, such that a first-order balancing act is not even required. If an 
exclusionary reason commands a particular result in a certain instance, that is the only result 
                                                          
42 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344, 372. 
43 Kaye, supra note 21, 70. 
44 Wainwright, supra note 24, [18]. 
45 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727. This change was rejected in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655. 
46 Wainwright, supra note 24, [18]. 
47 Campbell, supra note 16, [133]. See further Bennett, ‘Judicial Activism’ supra note 14. 
48 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP 1979); Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton University 
Press 1990). 
49 Raz (1990), id. 37–38. 
that may legitimately be reached. This is justifiable on rule-consequentialist grounds; that is, 
that one may ‘be better off in the long run by always following a predetermined course of 
action’ if one is required to make a decision ‘under conditions of impaired rationality or 
incomplete information.’50 For Raz, legal rules issued by a jurisdiction’s authoritative source, 
such as statute, operate on the law’s addressees as exclusionary reasons, mandating compliance 
irrespective of what might be thought desirable on a balance of first-order reasons. This applies 
not just to statutory declarations of rules, but – crucially, for our purposes – also to precedential 
authority. 
The desire to ensure legal certainty as a rule of law concern, and to delineate clearly the 
limits of legitimate judicial law-making, has led to the widespread adoption of a particular 
distinction between ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ styles of law-making. Put simply, according to 
proponents of this distinction, judges may not legitimately engage in law-making of a 
‘legislative’ type, but must make law only in a ‘judicial’ manner. We saw this distinction 
explicitly bulking large in Megarry V-C’s judgment in Malone, and the rule of law concern 
that underpins it is clearly evident also in the courts’ refusal to countenance ‘radical’ 
developments in Kaye, Wainwright and Campbell. 
However, despite its widespread rehearsal, the legislative/judicial distinction is deeply 
problematic. It suffers from two major flaws: a lack of clear definitions for either term and a 
lack of consistency not only in their use but in making the argument that they are, in fact, 
distinct. For example, Aileen Kavanagh, a proponent of the distinction, distinguishes ‘radical 
and broad-ranging reform’ (legislative) from ‘partial and piecemeal reform’ (judicial) in a 
manner that has much in common with Megarry V-C in Malone.51 But just what Megarry V-C 
meant by ‘radical and broad-ranging reform’ was unknowable in Malone and seems no clearer 
in the abstract world of scholarly literature. Kavanagh tells us that it may involve ‘radical policy 
change’ that has ‘economic and social implications’, which ‘may require the reconciliation and 
balancing of a broad range of conflicting interests and viewpoints’.52 These are the features, in 
her view, that place this sort of law-making beyond the legitimate role of judges. They are, 
however, descriptively under-determinate. We are not, for example, told where the line is to be 
drawn between ‘radical’ policy change and policy change that is not ‘radical’. Neither are we 
told how ‘broad’ the range of conflicting interests must be, nor how serious the ‘economic and 
social implications’ need to be, before they trigger this apparent rule against radicalism. 
Kavanagh also tells us that while legislators are entitled to make law in an entirely 
‘forward-looking’ fashion (without regard for past legal rules of any sort), judges are ‘obliged 
to . . . look backward at . . . the existence and import of existing precedents’.53 Her notion of 
the common law adjudicative process is thus tightly circumscribed. Judges are constrained to 
develop the law only using the ‘techniques’ of distinguishing, extending and overruling existing 
precedents.54 Kavanagh does not suggest that the judicial role ever includes recognising a novel 
legal rule. Rather she views the judicial common law role as being centred upon existing 
doctrine and allowing for some, tightly limited modification of it. 
                                                          
50 Stephen R Perry, ‘Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law’ (1987) 7(2) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 215, 220. 
51 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Idea of a Living Constitution’ (2003) 16 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 
55, 69; Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the Human Rights 
Act 1998’ (2004) 24(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 259, 261. See also Phillipson and Williams, supra note 
19, 903. 
52 Kavanagh (2004), id. 273. 
53 Id. 271. 
54 See section 4.1 on ‘Narrow incrementalism’, below. 
Kavanagh is right to acknowledge that judicial law-making is conditioned by pre-
existing law.55 But this observation in itself does not clarify the methodological limitations on 
judges as they take account of this pre-existing law. For the terms used in making this point 
(‘extending’, ‘adjusting’, ‘introducing small alterations’56) are also highly under-determinate. 
We are at no point told where precisely the line is to be drawn between an adjustment and a 
radical departure, nor between a small alteration and a larger one. 
The legislative/judicial distinction seems to rely on an intuitive sense of the limits of 
judicial law-making power. Lord Walker, writing extra-judicially, locates the same difficulty 
in judicial pronouncements that rely upon this legislative/judicial distinction: ‘it is not easy to 
discern, from the pronouncements of the House of Lords and the Supreme Court . . . what is, 
and what is not, off-limits for the development of the common law by a court of last resort. A 
lot seems to depend on judicial intuition’.57 We see precisely the difficulty that arises from this 
sort of under-determinacy in Malone. Addressing the question of whether or not he ought to 
recognise a distinct right to privacy at common law, Megarry V-C states: ‘At times judges must, 
and do, legislate; but . . . they do so only interstitially, and with molecular rather than molar 
motions . . . Anything beyond that must be left for legislation.’58 According to this, judges may 
legislate, but there is a limit on their legislative activity – the limit being to legislate only 
‘interstitially’.59 And so yet another under-determinate term inherits responsibility for clearing 
the matter up. 
Unfortunately, it clears up nothing. The notion of judges legislating interstitially 
features prominently in John Bell’s work on judicial decision-making.60 Bell tells us that where 
‘the rule itself does not dictate the answer’, judges are left ‘to make value-judgments about how 
the rule is best understood’.61 The making of a value-judgment in any given case then involves 
a form of creative decision-making that is, in Bell’s view, analogous to the legislative behaviour 
of Parliament. However, judges enjoy less freedom than Parliament – there are ‘limitations 
within which the judge exercises his choice’.62 Thus, ‘because of its limitation to partial and 
essentially remedial legal development within the confines of reasonable coherence and 
consistency with the rest of the law, judicial activity is narrower in scope than parliamentary 
law-making or administrative discretion.’63 
So, both Bell and Kavanagh’s conceptions of the judicial role, which delimit the 
judiciary from making ‘radical’ changes to existing doctrine, are rooted in a particular 
philosophy of adjudication that is in turn founded in a formalistic, procedural notion of the rule 
of law, of the sort we can associate with Raz. Yet both resort to highly under-determinate 
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language in order to prescribe the particular limitations on judicial law-making that they believe 
are necessary. Insofar as Kavanagh’s and Bell’s notions derive from and rely upon a Razian 
concept of law as an authoritative body of rules (centralising the function of providing adequate 
guidance by which the law’s addressees can prospectively regulate their conduct), this lack of 
clarity ought to trouble them. For if – as they insist – there really are clear limits on the judicial 
role, it ought surely to be possible to speak of them in plainer terms.  
Of course, it is not actually possible to delineate the law-making boundaries of the 
judicial role with the level of precision strict formalism demands. That is why neither Kavanagh 
nor Bell nor any other equally learned and thoughtful scholar has managed to do it. It is not 
possible because law is a human practice, inevitably tending towards intuitive judgments that 
inhere in the human thought process.64 Judges are not robots.65 Because of this, the very pursuit 
of a formalist utopia is doomed to failure. This is a point made time and time again in realist 
jurisprudential literature.66 But what can easily go unchallenged are the methodological aspects 
of the judicial practice that attempt to instantiate the formalists’ premise. They can go unnoticed 
because they are matters of detail rather than of broad-brush legal philosophy. We must 
therefore now turn our attention to the method by which judges elaborate the common law – a 
particular practice known as ‘incrementalism’. 
 
4 Incrementalism 
 
‘Incrementalism’ is a term used by common lawyers to describe the process by which the 
common law develops at the hands of judges.67 In relatively recent times, scholars who have 
championed the legislative/judicial distinction (who, broadly speaking, have tended to be 
drawn from the public law side of the legal spectrum) have seized upon incrementalism as a 
notion capable of providing some practical guidance to the courts as to how to go about their 
role (in accordance with a restrictive conception of that role derived from a formal conception 
of the rule of law).68 In particular, Gavin Phillipson and Alexander Williams have made a 
forceful case for incrementalism providing a model for the process of interstitial legislation.69 
In so doing they imply that the incremental method – if we can work out what it is – can clarify 
the operation of the legislative/judicial distinction, and perhaps cure some of the defects we 
identified above. 
‘Incrementalism’ entered into the popular legal lexicon in Brennan J’s judgment in the 
Australian High Court case of Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman.70 Brennan J’s 
incrementalism expressly informed the House of Lords’ judgment in the seminal negligence 
case of Caparo v Dickman Plc71 and recently received further affirmation from the UK 
Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.72 Lesley Dolding and Richard 
Mullender define incrementalism generally as ‘a form of adjudication involving the articulation 
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of liability rules which are, at once, new (and, hence, can properly be regarded as the fruit of 
judicial law-making) and yet are conditioned by pre-existing law.’73 
However, as Dolding and Mullender realise, the concept of incrementalism must be 
refined if it is to provide a clear method for legal development. This is because, like the other 
under-determinate terms we have already encountered, ‘what is incremental is to an extent in 
the eye of the beholder.’74 As Alison Young puts it when discussing the Wainwright case, 
‘creating a tort of privacy could be regarded as more than a merely incremental development 
of the common law.’75 Equally, creation of a privacy tort could be regarded as impeccably 
incremental.76 Thus, as Keith Stanton points out, the term ‘incrementalism’ has a ‘range of 
conceivable meanings’.77  
 
4.1 Narrow incrementalism 
 
The range of incrementalism’s meanings comprise a scale upon which we can plot more and 
less restrictive limits on judicial law-making. At the more restrictive end of the scale, Dolding 
and Mullender place what they call ‘narrow incrementalism’. This bears much similarity to 
what Stanton calls ‘gradualism’ and Cass Sunstein calls ‘minimalism’.78 It also aligns closely 
with an approach to public decision making that the political scientist Charles Lindblom calls 
‘successive limited comparisons’ and which he describes, perhaps more accessibly, as a process 
of ‘muddling through’.79 It is adopted by courts concerned to delimit the scope for judicial law-
making in a manner that suggests, when they do so, that a formalistic conception of the rule of 
law bulks large in their thinking. 
Narrow incrementalism treats precedent as having exclusionary force, and thus contains 
this feature of the Razian conception of the judicial function. Insofar as precedent operates as 
an exclusionary reason, first-order concerns that might lead the court towards an opposite 
conclusion in the absence of precedent are not even considered. The presence (or absence) of 
precedent is determinative of the outcome. If there is a lack of existing case law indicating a 
rule capable of extension to cover the novel scenario, narrow incrementalism denies any 
opportunity for extending the law. It results in the courts ‘refus[ing] . . . to contemplate’ 
elaborating the law in novel situations.80 So, in a novel case, liability will be imposed only if a 
sufficiently ‘tight’ analogy can be drawn with an existing liability rule. Conversely, if such an 
analogy cannot be found, there will be no liability and, crucially, no expansion of the law. 
Narrow incrementalism thus ‘reduces receptivity to strongly novel claims’.81 The courts 
have no need of regard to overarching or underlying principles. As such, ‘the law progresses 
fitfully, with only furtive reference to . . . community values’.82 Dolding and Mullender noted, 
in negligence cases, a ‘passivist’83 tendency to justify the use of the narrow incremental 
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approach by reference to issues of non-justiciability.84 By this they mean the notion that ‘certain 
disputes are unsuitable for judicial resolution’, either due to a lack of competency85 or 
legitimacy,86 or a ‘complex combination’ of the two.87 
In the context of negligence law, in cases where courts have adopted narrow 
incrementalism, it has confined the development of the law, in respect of the recognition of 
novel duties of care, to existing categories of such duties.88 The operation of narrow 
incrementalism in post-Campbell privacy cases has achieved a similar state of affairs, confining 
privacy rights to the obvious existing category of case – informational rights.89 Narrow 
incrementalism in the privacy context, then, precludes as a matter of method the adoption of a 
novel category of privacy tort dealing with intrusion into an individual’s seclusion.90 Only cases 
within existing categories may provide a foundation for a tight analogy with a novel case. So 
long as courts operate in the narrow incremental mode, inspired by this formalist conception of 
the judicial role, they consider themselves ‘unable’91 (rather than merely ‘unwilling’92) to 
recognise a new tort to guard against novel types of privacy violation. 
 
4.2 Wide incrementalism 
 
The wide incremental (or principled)93 approach legitimises the court having regard to 
overarching principles in order to found novel causes of action, either in the complete absence 
of precedent, or where there are only hostile or unhelpful authorities. Dolding and Mullender 
contrast it with narrow incrementalism thus: ‘while judges operating in the wide incrementalist 
mode look to presently existing doctrine for guidance as to the nature of the wrongful 
transactions comprehended by the law, they do not exhibit the degree of doctrine-boundness 
manifested by judges engaged in the practice of narrow incrementalism.’94 
Wide incrementalism therefore shuns ‘the requirement that the facts of a novel claim 
have to be comprehended by an existing category of case in order to ground a cause of action’ 
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that is indicative of narrow incrementalism.95 It eschews the formalist quest for a single right 
answer. Thus, a court operating in the wide incremental mode might legitimately reach any one 
of a number of defensible conclusions on a given point of law. This potential for the 
accommodation of ‘reasonable pluralism’,96 or ‘reasonable disagreement’,97 gives rise to 
several further metaphors about the normative space within which judging takes place. Richard 
Posner talks of a ‘zone of reasonableness’,98 whilst Mullender, echoing Benjamin Cardozo, 
dwells on a ‘field of interpretative possibility’99 within which judges operate when deciding 
‘open cases’100 (that is, cases in which precedent is not determinative of the outcome). This 
field is ‘shaped by norms that (so far as the imperfections of language will allow) mark out its 
boundaries and place constraints on judges’.101 These constraints include (i) ‘the area-specific 
source (eg a rule or doctrine or concept) invoked by a judge in support of his or her decision’,102 
and (ii) ‘the system of law within which particular rules, doctrines and concepts have force.’103 
Within this systemic ‘field’, judges ‘may specify a range of politically controversial norms’,104 
each of which provides a ‘defensible’ answer to the legal problem in issue.105 There is no 
suggestion that these boundaries are either clear-cut or immutable. Indeed, novel decisions can 
alter the shape of this field simply by virtue of taking place within it.106 
The model of wide incrementalism offered by Dolding and Mullender (and the 
spectrum of incrementalism to which it gives rise) is not uncontroversial. Stanton has doubted 
whether it can properly be described as ‘incremental’ at all.107 Dolding and Mullender, for 
instance, identify Donoghue108 and Anns109 as decisions made in the wide incremental mode. 
For Stanton, describing these decisions as incremental at all ‘seems inappropriate’, since those 
cases show it to ‘possess[] the capacity for developing the law . . . radically’.110 Dolding and 
Mullender maintain, however, that wide incrementalism enables courts to secure ‘fidelity to 
law’.111 This, on their account, ‘enjoins judges both to give effect (where applicable) to the 
law’s presently existing requirements (narrow fidelity) and to pursue the purposes which 
inform a particular body of law (wide fidelity)’.112 The purposes informing law (on their notion 
of wide fidelity) include ‘principles, policies, [and] models of human association’.113 In a 
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manner that will be familiar to American audiences, their defence of the wide incremental 
method thus shares central features with Karl Llewellyn’s ‘grand style’ of adjudication.114  
 
4.3 Narrow incrementalism in English and Welsh privacy cases 
 
We have already seen evidence that the narrow incremental mode predominates in English and 
Welsh privacy cases. In Malone, Kaye and Wainwright, the courts ruled out the recognition of 
novel privacy torts based on a lack of precedent and on the formalistic legislative/judicial 
distinction in respect of the limits of the judicial law-making role. This brings us to the 
emergence of the doctrine of ‘misuse of private information’ (MPI) in Campbell. 
The court’s obligation as a public authority, under Section 6 Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA), to develop (incrementally) the common law compatibly with European Convention 
rights,115 led to an influential article by Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson. In it, they argued 
that the equitable doctrine of confidence was ‘ripe’ for transformation into a privacy law.116 In 
Campbell, the House of Lords did precisely as Fenwick and Phillipson had suggested. 
The seminal decision in Campbell, in which the nomenclature ‘misuse of private 
information’ was introduced to English and Welsh law for the first time and in which the most 
basic contours of MPI doctrine were sketched out, is itself the fruit of narrow incrementalism. 
I have made this argument in more detail elsewhere and I will not repeat the detail of that 
analysis here.117 But the core evidence for its being the fruit of a narrowly incremental mode 
of adjudication is as follows. First, there is no unequivocal statement in any of the judgments 
in Campbell of an intention to recognise a novel (as opposed to simply re-labelled) head of 
liability. Second, there is no unequivocal statement that the cause of action relied upon has 
changed its basis from being equitable (as in the older doctrine of confidence) to being tortious. 
Third, there is a clear rejection (in Baroness Hale’s judgment) of any suggestion that the court 
has recognised – or indeed that it could recognise – a general privacy tort, insisting instead that 
the courts will respond only to ‘types of activities’ already covered by an existing head of 
liability.118  
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The judgments within Campbell indicate a broad concern that the House ought not to 
appear to be acting in a particularly activist fashion. The judgments thus paint a picture of a 
court committed to limiting creativity in the common law to the development of liability rules 
under existing heads of liability. This approach to common law development is a classic 
hallmark of the narrow incremental mode. Moreover, Gavin Phillipson, whose essay on the 
subject was cited with approval by the House in Campbell,119 argued for and clearly expected 
only narrowly incremental development of the law. It is clear that on Phillipson’s 
understanding of indirect horizontality, ‘whereby courts have a duty to apply the Convention 
rights in private law cases, but only to existing causes of action’, the establishment of a novel 
tort seems beyond the effect that the HRA is capable of mandating.120 Implicit in this also 
seems to be an acceptance that, without the HRA mandating such an establishment, the courts 
would not be willing to go so far in the discharge of their role as incremental developers of the 
common law. Such acceptance accords, in his work, the narrow mode of incrementalism the 
status of being the only legitimate such mode.  
The fact that the courts, in more recent cases such as Gulati and PJS,121 have not taken 
the opportunity to recognise ‘intrusion’ as a separate tortious act – even obiter – indicates that 
narrow incrementalism continues to predominate in the English and Welsh privacy landscape 
post-Campbell. Having established the predominance of narrow incrementalism on these 
shores, we must next turn our attention to our comparator jurisdiction: Canada. 
 
5 The Canadian approach: Jones v Tsige 
 
In the 2012 case of Jones v Tsige, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognised a novel intrusion 
tort. The defendant had accessed, without authorisation, the banking records of the plaintiff at 
least 174 times over a four-year period. For our purposes, what is most noteworthy about the 
Court of Appeal’s decision is that it is not hampered by the sort of formalist conception of the 
judicial role that predominates in England and Wales. 
At first instance, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed summarily. The motions judge 
accepted the defendant’s argument that Ontario recognised no tort of intrusion, based on the 
ruling in the earlier Euteneier case.122 In the Court of Appeal, however, Sharpe JA (giving 
judgment for the court) does not find the Euteneier judgment dispositive of the plaintiff’s claim. 
It was stated in Euteneier that ‘there is no “free standing” right to dignity or privacy under the 
[Canadian] Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] or at common law’. Sharpe JA, however, 
distinguishes the facts of Euteneier with relative ease, remarking that this obiter statement 
‘could not have been intended to express any dispositive or definitive opinion as to the 
existence of a tort claim for [the] breach of a privacy interest’.123 By using the technique of 
distinguishing a hostile precedent, Sharpe JA is acting well within the limits of the ‘judicial’ 
mode of law-making as outlined by Kavanagh. However, he then goes further.  
Sharpe JA eschews authorities that are inconclusive or even (in one case) hostile to the 
notion that an intrusion-type tort of privacy could be recognised. Acknowledging that, ‘[i]n 
Canada, there has been no definitive statement from an appellate court on the issue of whether 
there is a common law right of action corresponding to the intrusion on seclusion category’, 
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Sharpe JA points out that, in several cases, courts have refused to strike out such claims.124 
Indeed, ‘dicta in at least two cases [from other provinces] support the idea’ that a common law 
right of action for intrusion-type privacy violations can lie.125  
Besides the lack of precedent for an intrusion tort, the respondent (defendant), Winnie 
Tsige, also argued that the presence of legislation in the field of privacy precluded judicial 
intervention. For its presence ‘reflects carefully considered economic and policy choices’ that 
are beyond the capacity of the courts: ‘expanding the reach of the common law in this area 
would interfere with these carefully crafted regimes . . . [A]ny expansion of the law relating to 
the protection of privacy should be left to Parliament and the legislature.’126 
This argument finds no favour. Four common law provinces (British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland) have enacted statutory torts of invasion of 
privacy, whilst the civil law province of Québec explicitly protects a right to privacy in its civil 
code.127 However, none of these offer a conclusive definition of what constitutes an invasion 
of privacy. As Sharpe JA points out, ‘existing provincial legislation indicates that when the 
legislatures have acted, they have simply proclaimed a sweeping right to privacy and left it to 
the courts to define the contours of that right’.128 He concludes, therefore, that ‘it would take a 
strained interpretation to infer from these statutes a legislative intent to supplant or halt the 
development of the common law in this area’.129  
The judge’s treatment of this line of argument provides a clear contrast with the English 
and Welsh cases we have considered. Tsige’s submissions are formalistic; her argument is that 
the mere presence of the hostile precedent (Euteneier) and statutes in this field operates as a 
Razian exclusionary rule which prohibits the recognition of a novel tort. Sharpe JA has a 
significantly broader field of vision and is far more attentive to context. For he delves into the 
content of Euteneier, and of statutes and further provisions (from other provinces) not 
mentioned by Tsige. With the benefit of having that content at his fingertips, he relates it far 
more closely than Tsige does to the issue at hand. It is this that enables him to determine that 
Euteneier should be distinguished. It also leads him to conclude that the best interpretation of 
the legislative intent behind the Ontarian statutes is the polar opposite of that for which Tsige 
argues; that the under-determinate language pervading these various statutory provisions 
implicitly discloses a commitment to leaving the courts to determine the scope of privacy 
protections. 
Sharpe JA’s survey of relevant doctrinal matters does not, however, end there. Having 
considered law directly on the point of intrusion, he then points to ‘the principle that the 
common law should be developed in a manner consistent with Charter values’.130 Unlike the 
UK’s Human Rights Act, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not explicitly 
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protect privacy.131 But privacy is a value that underpins other expressly protected rights. In 
Hunter v Southam Inc,132 Dickson J ‘observed that the interests engaged by [Section] 8 are not 
simply an extension of the concept of trespass, but rather are grounded in an independent right 
to privacy held by all citizens’.133  
The ‘Charter values’ argument does not in itself provide full justification for the step 
that Sharpe JA takes in recognising a novel intrusion tort. To supplement the ‘Charter values’ 
argument, Sharpe JA makes an implicit appeal to underlying principle: the tortious ideal of 
‘corrective justice’. The ideal of corrective justice imposes upon wrongdoers the duty to correct 
the harm or losses that their wrongdoing occasions.134 The pursuit of corrective justice within 
tort law necessitates a strong focus on the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the cause of that 
harm.135 There are significant indications that a commitment to the pursuit of corrective justice 
underpins the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones. There is a strong focus on the 
harm that the plaintiff suffered and the cause of that harm (the defendant’s wrongful conduct), 
with a particular concern evident for the potential threats to privacy posed by ‘technological 
change’ (or ‘the internet and digital technology’).136 Sharpe JA highlights the ‘deliberate, 
prolonged and shocking’ nature of Tsige’s actions, concluding that ‘[a]ny person in Jones’ 
position would be profoundly disturbed by the significant intrusion into her highly personal 
information.’137 Moreover, ‘we are presented in this case with facts that cry out for a remedy  
. . . In my view, the law of this province would be sadly deficient if we were required to send 
Jones away without a legal remedy.’138 
This strongly suggests that Sharpe JA is concerned to impose liability for broad reasons 
of principle: ‘a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must 
pay’.139 His broad attentiveness to Charter and common law Canadian jurisprudence, to the 
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case law of foreign jurisdictions and to a range of academic comment on the subject of privacy, 
all point towards a strong concern to fashion a cause of action aimed at providing redress for 
an ‘obvious social wrong’.140 
What we therefore see in Jones is evidence of the wide incremental mode of common 
law development.141 First, the recognition of a new intrusion tort, rejecting Tsige’s argument 
that it is not open to the court to do so, indicates that some significant development of the law 
is taking place. Second, Sharpe JA’s refusal to be troubled by Euteneier, the lack of precedent 
for an intrusion tort, and the presence of privacy legislation, indicates that he is not operating 
in the ‘doctrine-bound’ mode associated with narrow incrementalism.142 Third, the central 
place that principle – that tort law exists to achieve corrective justice – occupies in the judgment 
is a hallmark of wide incrementalism. Likewise, the appeal to the ‘Charter value’ of privacy 
as a justification for the recognition of a new tort, rather than dwelling on the limited existing 
doctrine, indicates that he perceives incrementalism as embracing, and allowing for, a wide 
approach.  
 
6 Further developments 
 
Whilst we have closely examined only one comparator example, adjudicating privacy cases in 
the wide incremental mode is not confined to a single, Canadian decision. Within months of 
the Jones decision, the New Zealand High Court followed suit, recognising a similar intrusion 
tort in Holland.143 Every feature of wide incremental decision-making that we have located in 
Jones is also present in Holland.  
In Holland, Whata J is attentive to relevant precedent in the form of the leading New 
Zealand privacy case, Hosking v Runting.144 He is also attentive to the incrementalism 
spectrum. For a range of forms of incrementalism are identified in Hosking and each form 
receives support from at least one judge in that case (though no single mode attracts majority 
support). Having identified the spectrum, Whata J then formulates his own position as to the 
mode of incrementalism appropriate in this case and ultimately stakes out a position similar to 
that which Tipping J adopts in Hosking. Had Whata J not paid such detailed attention to 
Hosking, he might only have felt able to adopt the narrower incremental mode favoured by the 
leading judgment in that case (that of Gault P and Blanchard J). This is despite the fact that 
there is actually no majority support for the narrower incremental mode in Hosking: Gault P 
and Blanchard J support it, but Keith and Anderson JJ reject it as permitting too much legal 
development (that is, they see it as too activist), whilst Tipping J prefers a wider mode enabling 
greater development.  
Jones is also not the end of the story in Canada. In 2016, the Ontario Superior Court 
recognised another new privacy tort – public disclosure of private facts – in the case of Jane 
Doe.145 The case concerned something we would today identify as ‘revenge pornography’. The 
defendant uploaded a private, sexual video of the plaintiff to a pornographic website and shared 
the video around various of his and the plaintiff’s acquaintances. The plaintiff’s claims in 
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breach of confidence and intentional infliction of emotional distress succeeded. For our 
purposes, however, the most significant part of the case is the court’s determination of the claim 
for invasion of privacy. Stinson J considers the Jones intrusion tort in detail, but is disinclined 
to shoe-horn the facts of Doe into it, instead recognising another novel tort: ‘While the facts of 
this case bear some of the hallmarks of the tort of “intrusion upon seclusion”, they more closely 
fall within Prosser’s second category: “Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about 
the plaintiff”.’146 
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision to adopt the wide incremental mode in Jones 
thus firmly establishes the legitimacy of that developmental mode. It sets the tone for 
subsequent developments in Ontarian (and, in all likelihood, broader Canadian) privacy law. 
Before we draw our conclusions, however, we must briefly say something about the coherence 
of the courts’ preferred modes of incrementalism with tort law more broadly in the jurisdictions 
upon which we have dwelt. 
 
7 Incremental (in)coherence 
 
When we contrast the prevailing mode of incrementalism in privacy cases in England and 
Wales with that which underpins the Jones judgment, it is plain to see that the former is 
significantly more restrictive than the latter. Given this, it is worth considering whether this 
reflects a broader jurisdictional divergence in our understandings of what incrementalism ought 
to involve. 
The Jones and Doe cases fit well within broader Canadian tort law in adopting wide 
incrementalism. Negligence law in Canada has long been more open to novel categories of 
claim than English and Welsh negligence law; the Anns test, derided by many147 and eventually 
abandoned by the English and Welsh courts for being too open to novel claims,148 still forms 
the basis of Canadian negligence law today (albeit in a modified form with reduced scope for 
activism).149 
But the narrow incrementalism on display in English and Welsh privacy cases does not 
sit anything like so well within broader English and Welsh tort law. Negligence law, in this 
jurisdiction, has long embraced wide incrementalism. The Supreme Court recently confirmed 
this expressly in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.150 In Robinson, the court 
discussed the incremental method in detail in the context of novel duty of care cases.151 The 
court makes plain that, in the absence of tightly analogous precedent, courts should consider 
whether broader, underlying legal principles indicate a way forward. This is one hallmark of 
wide incrementalism. Moreover, if no clear principle settles matters, the courts are further 
directed to have regard to (even broader) policy considerations – matters that once found 
expression in the trite ‘fair, just and reasonable’ limb of Caparo.152 Thus the Supreme Court 
plainly envisages situations arising in which the absence of tightly (or even somewhat less 
tightly) analogous precedent does not constitute a Razian exclusionary reason militating against 
the recognition of a novel category of liability. Such situations have arisen in negligence. For 
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example, in Watson v BBBC, the court recognised a novel duty of care to provide ringside 
medical equipment at a boxing match, opening up a novel duty category.153 
A further point of comparison is provided by defamation law. In Canada, a public 
interest defence to defamation – responsible communication on matters of public interest – was 
recognised in Grant v Torstar.154 Grant was itself a combined appeal bringing together two 
cases: Grant itself and Cusson v Quan (both emanating from Ontario). In Cusson, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal – once again with Sharpe JA giving the leading judgment – had recognised a 
sui generis public interest defence in much the same terms that eventually formed the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Grant.155 What is key about this for our purposes is the acknowledgement 
that the defence was sui generis (that is, that it was not a mere extension of an existing 
defence).156 The Supreme Court in Grant makes this explicit when McLachlin CJ states, in a 
one-sentence paragraph dedicated solely to making the point, that responsible communication 
‘should be viewed as a new defence, leaving the traditional defence of qualified privilege 
intact.’157 
In England and Wales, the broadly equivalent case in defamation was the House of 
Lords’ Reynolds decision, which established the eponymous defence.158 In Reynolds itself, the 
House of Lords constructed its judgment in a manner reminiscent of its approach (a few years 
later) in Campbell. The House characterised the nascent defence as a mere extension of the 
older doctrine of common law qualified privilege, and declined to expand it into a broad 
defence protecting any political speech on the basis that to do so would be too radical an 
extension of the existing doctrine.159 
But, ultimately, Reynolds came to be regarded as a sui generis defence. Judicial 
suggestions that the Reynolds defence was sui generis emerged in the Court of Appeal in 
Loutchansky.160 Subsequently, in Jameel, Lord Hoffmann agreed with the Loutchansky view 
of Reynolds privilege as a sui generis defence and remarked that ‘[i]t might more appropriately 
be called the Reynolds public interest defence rather than privilege’.161 Baroness Hale agreed 
with Lord Hoffmann, saying ‘[i]t should by now be entirely clear that the Reynolds defence is 
a “different jurisprudential creature” from the law of privilege.’162 Meanwhile, leading 
textbooks were also suggesting that Reynolds was sui generis. Gatley on Libel and Slander 
(eleventh edition) noted that Reynolds privilege is ‘of a very different nature from the 
“classical” privilege founded on a relationship [between the parties]’.163 Carter-Ruck on Libel 
and Privacy stated that ‘the better view is that Reynolds privilege is a different type of privilege 
from traditional qualified privilege’.164 Lord Phillips (who had himself coined the ‘different 
jurisprudential creature’ description in Loutchansky) later characterised Reynolds as sui generis 
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in the Supreme Court case of Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd – over a decade after the Reynolds 
case.165 
What we have uncovered is that, in Canada, the recognition of the Jones intrusion tort, 
and the subsequent Doe private facts tort, fits coherently with the developmental methodology 
employed by the courts in other areas of tort law. But in England and Wales, the development 
of the Campbell MPI doctrine stands apart from the methodology utilised in other branches of 
tort, including negligence and defamation. Intrusion torts have been recognised in jurisdictions 
that embrace wide incrementalism (including Canada and New Zealand). But in England and 
Wales, the rigid adherence to narrow incrementalism, attributable to the predominance of a 
formalistic conception of the judicial role, inhibits the development of such a tort. 
It may be that, one day, Campbell comes to be seen as a sui generis tort, which – by a 
process of reasoning backwards – might lead to a re-characterisation of the decision as an 
instance of wide incrementalism. But the evidence suggests that is not yet happening, and it 
would be a difficult case to make.166 In the only litigation to have considered directly whether 
the Campbell MPI doctrine is distinct from the equitable doctrine of confidence, Vidal-Hall v 
Google, Inc, both the High Court167 and Court of Appeal168 held that it was indeed distinct. But 
neither court was able to explain how, as a matter of formal law, MPI emerged as a separate 
‘tort’. This suggests that neither court was willing to countenance the idea that the House of 
Lords had ‘created’ a novel tort by operating in the wide incremental mode (in a manner that 
could be described as amounting to a ‘radical’ development). Moreover, even in recent privacy 
cases, the Wainwright mantra – that the courts will not recognise a novel tort of privacy but 
will only develop existing causes of action – continues to be rehearsed.169 This indicates that 
the perceived ‘formal barrier’ to the recognition of an intrusion tort, which leads to the courts 
operating in the narrow rather than wide incremental mode, continues to exert considerable 
force over English and Welsh privacy law. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
English and Welsh law does not have a tort of intrusion. Canadian law does. But the important 
question is not whether Canadian law is therefore better than English and Welsh law. The 
important question is why English and Welsh law lacks such a tort. In order to answer that 
question, it helps to understand how Canadian law has come to have such a tort. We have 
located a clear methodological difference between the two jurisdictions in respect of privacy. 
Whilst English and Welsh privacy law has developed along narrow incremental lines, Canada 
has embraced the more ‘activist’ wide incremental method. Through our examination of the 
cases upon which we have dwelt, we have shown this methodological difference to have played 
a central role in the substantive difference vis-à-vis the existence of intrusion torts that persist 
between these two jurisdictions. The notion of incrementalism that prevails in a particular 
jurisdiction is crucial to the potential for developing novel heads of liability at common law. 
This means that we are in a position to say that one significant reason why English and 
Welsh law continues to display a lacuna in respect of ‘pure’ intrusions into privacy is the 
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prevailing methodology of its courts when operating in this field. The predominance of narrow 
incrementalism results, inevitably, in the lacuna. Moreover, we have been able to attribute the 
predominance of this methodology to a particular, restrictive conception of the judicial role 
which is itself derived from a classically formalist understanding of the rule of law. This 
diagnosis should enable us to drive debate in this field forward. 
The diagnosis also means we are in a position to start sketching out a solution to the 
intrusion lacuna. Merely arguing that an intrusion tort should be developed, and even that it 
ought to be ‘incrementally’ developed, will not get us past the formal barrier blocking the 
recognition of such a tort. What is needed is a more detailed and nuanced appreciation of the 
impulses that lie behind the methodology which results in the formal barrier, such that those 
impulses themselves may be challenged. 
Formalism promises certainty. But it fails abjectly to deliver it. English and Welsh law’s 
rigid insistence on shoe-horning all privacy claims into a single, ill-fitting vehicle – the doctrine 
of ‘misuse of private information’ – has actively encouraged unforeseeable and formally 
suspect developments within that doctrine.170 Moreover, narrow incrementalism is nothing like 
so overtly predominant in other areas of tort law. This fact – that there is no single prevailing 
methodology for developing the common law applicable across the entirety of the tort law 
spectrum (let alone across all of private law, still less across private and public law) – further 
demonstrates formalism’s failure to deliver certainty. When privacy and defamation law are 
developing along different methodological lines within the same jurisdiction, formalism clearly 
does not have a firm grip on proceedings.  
Still further, the very notion that judges should limit themselves to making ‘small’ 
changes to existing doctrine and avoid making ‘radical’ ones (and other similarly-worded 
injunctions) is itself wholly under-determinate and ultimately reliant on judicial intuition. This 
goes against everything that formalism counsels. It may well be that reliance upon judicial 
intuition in respect of the limits of judges’ legitimate law-making powers is inevitable, since 
(a) we are dealing with a human practice, and (b) that practice is deliverable only through 
systems of language that are open-textured.171 But if that is the case – and it appears to be so – 
then the formalist quest for certainty is doomed to fail. Doctrinal developments that occur in 
furtherance of it are built on sand.  
The development of an intrusion tort in Ontario, followed as it has been in New 
Zealand, shows a way forward. Canadian judges are every bit as attentive as British judges to 
the need to strike some sort of balance between the competing yet incompatible demands of 
maintaining legal certainty and ensuring justice is done in each individual case. Indeed, Robert 
Sharpe, who gave the judgment in Jones, has recently devoted a whole book to discussing his 
approach to that very balance.172 Canada’s constitutional background is much like the UK’s. 
Its human rights framework – the Charter – operates in much the same way as our Human 
Rights Act. Its judges are schooled in the same common law tradition. Its judicial institutions 
are based on the same, precedential, adversarial system as ours. But Canada has moved beyond 
‘blind and empty formalism’.173 English and Welsh law has done so too, in other fields. Now 
it must do so in privacy. For that is the only way to a common law tort of intrusion. 
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